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Abstract 
The firm’s credit rating is an important communication tool and previous research has shown that many companies 
consider it important in capital structure decisions. This study examines the determinants of capital structure in MENA 
banks. In addition, it investigates the determinants of credit rating. Further, the impact of credit rating and capital struc-
ture on banks’ performance is examined. Therefore, this study is an attempt to answer the following questions: 1) what 
are the main determinants of capital structure? 2) how does credit rating affect capital structure? 3) what are the main 
determinants of credit rating? and 4) what is the effect of capital structure and credit rating on bank performance? The 
sample covers 169 banks and is divided into two sub-samples: rated (79) and non-rated banks (90). The results indicate 
that credit rating directly affects the capital structure decisions as rated banks use more debts than non-rated banks. 
Banks’ performance is positively associated with credit rating and negatively with the capital structure. This study has 
an implication on investors in their decisions to invest in the banking industry. It also helpful for policy makers to un-
derstand how bank’s capital structure behaves so they could take it into consideration when issuing new regulations 
such as Basel. 
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Introduction¤ 
Capital structure is one of the most intriguing cor-
porate issues and continues to motivate top man-
agement and academics to determine the optimal 
combination of debt and equity that will maximize 
firm value and increase investors’ pecuniary bene-
fits. Although there has been an extensive empirical 
research on capital structure, to date there is no 
unanimous consensus regarding the best mix of debt 
and equity (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015). 
Academic interest in capital structure dates back to 
the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
who proposed that under ‘‘perfect’’ capital markets 
a firm’s value is unaffected by its capital structure. 
However, the existence of several ‘‘imperfections’’ 
in the real world (such as adverse selection, moral 
hazard, agency conflicts, market frictions and taxes) 
creates obstacles to a firm’s access to external 
finance (Vermoesen et al., 2013). Credit rating is an 
increasingly important component of finance theory 
and practice (Kisgen, 2009). Moreover, Jucá et al. 
(2012) investigate the banks’ capital structure using 
a sample of U.S. and Brazilian banks. Their find-
ings are in agreement with the work done by Gropp 
and Heider (2010) in that the standard determinants 
of capital structure are of first order in explaining 
the capital structure. They found that the majority of 
the determinants they hypothesized were significant 
in explaining the capital structure of bank. These 
are asset risk, deposits, size, growth, tangibility and 
dividends. The previous literature that examines the 
nature and the determinants of corporate structure in 
Western countries is very rich, however, a limited 
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number of studies have examined the nature and 
determinants of capital structure of banks in the 
MENA region. In addition, most of the empirical 
studies that examine the capital structure decision 
focused only on some of the commonly used va-
riables such as profitability, asset structure, size, 
growth opportunities, liquidity, effective tax rate, 
inflation rate, and operating risk.  
Although there has been an extensive prior research 
examining the determinants of capital structure 
decisions, there is a limited research explaining 
credit rating as one of these determinants. Kisgen 
(2006) found that credit rating directly affects capi-
tal structure decisions on the US market in the pe-
riod from 1986 to 2001. In his study, he found that 
companies near a credit rating upgrade or down-
grade issued less debt relative to net equity as a 
percentage of total assets than firms not near a cre-
dit rating change, a finding which is inconsistent 
with the traditional capital structure theories, as 
their predictions do not include the impact of credit 
rating on capital structure decisions. A similar study 
performed by Michelsen and Klein (2011) on an 
international sample in the period of 1990-2008 
found further evidence of credit rating impact on 
firms’ financial gearing decisions. More recently, 
Drobetz and Heller (2014) used a sample of listed 
US firms and one of listed and non-listed German 
firms in order to test the credit rating- capital struc-
ture hypothesis. The results from the U.S. sample 
corroborated Kisgen’s (2006, 2009) credit rating 
capital structure hypothesis, suggesting that there 
exists a minimum target rating and that financial 
distress concerns are only of secondary importance. 
What the previous studies on the topic have in 
common is that they largely focus on U.S. data due 
to the extensive use of corporate bonds as well as 
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credit rating in the U.S. capital markets. However, a 
few empirical studies have examined the effect of 
credit rating on capital structure decisions, especial-
ly in the developing countries, and more specifical-
ly, in MENA area. Credit rating has gained an in-
creasingly relevant role in the past decades. In fi-
nancial markets, its importance has been acknowl-
edged since its beginning in the 19th century, as the 
primary objective of credit rating is to decrease 
information asymmetry by providing the issuer’s 
creditworthiness to the investors. The role and the 
effect of credit rating increase steadily. Credit rating 
affects the cost of firm’s debt financing as lower 
credit rating leads to an increase in the cost of debt. 
There is an association between the capital require-
ment of the bank with the credit rating issued for the 
banks by a credit rating agency; the higher the 
bank’s credit rating, the lower the capital require-
ment. Credit rating is also used to deal with the 
default risk of counterparty. Some contracts require 
parties engaged in a contract to have specific credit 
rating, and if the credit rating of one party falls be-
low a specific rating, the other party can withdraw 
from the contract. The empirical studies also con-
firm the significance of credit rating. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) find that “the most important factors 
affecting debt policy are maintaining financial flex-
ibility and having a good credit rating.” Gray et al. 
(2006) point out that “credit rating is of great prac-
tical importance, as they impact the firm’s cost of 
debt, its financial structure, and even its ability to 
continue trading”. Servaes and Tufano (2006) con-
firm that credit rating is far more important in capi-
tal structure decisions than suggested by the theory. 
From their study, survey respondents indicate that 
they are the single most important factor in firm’s 
decisions. 
The role of credit rating agencies has increased in 
the last years. Asgharian (2005) argues that the 
development in the credit rating agencies is related 
to two important factors, those factors are disinter-
mediation and globalization. Credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) play two important roles: valuation role and 
facilitate contracting (Frost, 2006). With regard to 
the role of valuation, CRAs act as screening agents. 
Rates provided by the CRAs also are considered as 
covenants, so they can be used as efficient credit 
quality benchmark. Credit rating facilitates the con-
tracting process between the company and the other 
party (Frost, 2006). The credit rating analysts start 
their work by visiting the company and analyzing 
both the financial and non-financial aspects of the 
company. The financial aspects include, for exam-
ple: leverage, profitability, liquidity, size, and 
growth opportunities, and this will be explained in 
more details in the analysis of credit rating determi-
nants. The non-financial aspects include, for exam-
ple: industry risk, country risk, company’s competi-
tive position, management quality, company reputa-
tion, and the degree of reliance on specific suppliers 
and customers. Credit rating gives a signal for both 
public information and non-public information. 
CRAs reduce information asymmetries between the 
managers of the company and investors. According 
to Boot et al. (2003), “rating agencies could be seen 
as information-processing agencies that may speed 
up the dissemination of information to financial 
markets”. And, according to Champsaur (2005), 
“credit rating promote market efficiency by allo- 
wing issuers to signal their creditworthiness to 
lender, thus, helping lenders to allocate capital to 
creditworthy borrowers”. Company with a high 
credit rating will access the capital market easily 
and, in the same time, can issue more debt. High 
credit rating provides the company with the legiti-
macy to issue more debt than those companies with 
lower credit rating. Asgharian (2005) identifies the 
motives for companies to get higher credit rating 1) 
high credit rating increases the ability of the com-
pany to issue debt and facilitates its access to the 
capital market, 2) new companies can make the best 
use of high credit rating through building up their 
market reputation, and 3) lower cost of fund as cre-
dit rating can be seen as a competitive advantage 
that distinguishes one company from another com-
pany, especially, in industries characterized by a 
limited number of competing companies. Several 
studies have found evidence to support both the 
trade-off and pecking order theories (e.g., Brounen 
et al., 2005; Fama and French, 2002; Shyam-
Sunders and Myers, 1999), but, due to the complex 
nature of the field of capital structure, these theories 
do not capture all relevant factors that may affect a 
firm’s debt–equity choice, and there is, yet, no un-
iversally accepted theory explaining the capital 
structure decision of firms (Adeyemi and Oboh, 
2011; Kronwald, 2009). Moreover, Dasilas and 
Papasyriopoulos (2015) claim that firm-specific 
determinants such as size, profitability, asset struc-
ture and growth opportunities are also significant 
determinants of leverage. 
The main theories that explain the capital structure 
decisions are trade-off and pecking order theories. 
In the trade-off theory, capital structure decisions 
depend on the costs and benefits associated with 
debt financing, or, to put it another way, a firm’s 
optimal leverage is determined by a trade-off of the 
costs and benefits of holding debt (Myers, 1984). 
The theory holds that a firm, in order to achieve an 
optimal capital structure that maximizes the total 
market value, seeks debt levels that balance the 
value of interest tax shields against the various costs 
of bankruptcy or financial distress. The trade-off 
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theory implies that the benefits of holding debt 
(e.g., the tax shield) will cause firms of higher 
quality (rating), and, thereby, lower risk of bank-
ruptcy, to issue more debt relative to firms of lower 
quality. Under the trade-off theory, the firm com-
pares the advantages with the disadvantages of us-
ing debt relative to equity and the optimal point is 
the point that balances both at the margin. Using 
debt leads to tax deductibility that motivates the 
firm to use more debt relative to equity. But the 
extent to which the firm can benefit from this tax 
deductibility will depend on the ability of the firm 
to produce taxable income. In addition, there are 
two types of costs of using debt: financial distress 
(bankruptcy costs) and agency costs. First: financial 
distress costs are divided into direct costs and indi-
rect costs. Direct costs are considered out-of-pocket 
cash expenses and include the following: fees of 
lawyers, administrative fees and value of manageri-
al time spent in administering the bankruptcy. In 
other words, the direct costs of bankruptcy include 
the legal, administrative and reorganizing costs that 
result from bankruptcy (Haugent and Senbet, 1978). 
The indirect costs are not considered as cash ex-
penses. They include damage of the firm reputation 
that leads to the loss of skilled employees and, also, 
include the diversion of management time while 
bankruptcy is underway (Titman, 1984). Palata 
(2003) argues that the indirect costs of bankruptcy 
include: the impaired ability to conduct business 
and tendency to underinvestment. Second: agency 
costs that arise as a result of the conflict of interest 
between the shareholders and debtors. Kisgen 
(2006) argues that there are costs and benefits asso-
ciated with the different levels of credit rating. 
Those costs and benefits will differ from one firm to 
another according to the rate provided to each one. 
Those costs and benefits associated with the differ-
ent credit rating should be in the mind of managers 
when they are making a decision about the level of 
debt they will issue. Managers should balance the 
costs and benefits of different credit rating against 
the costs and benefits of the traditional trade-off 
theory. The optimal level of debt that will maximize 
the firm’s value under the traditional trade-off 
theory will differ from the optimal level of debt if 
the benefits and costs of the different levels of cre-
dit rating are considered. Kisgen (2006) indicates 
that different credit rating will have an effect on the 
firm debt ratio and, in turn, on the maximum value 
the firm can reach. Kisgen (2006) tests the effect of 
the change in the credit rating on the traditional 
trade of theory and argues that “firms near an up-
grade or a downgrade may be less willing to in-
crease their debt levels, even if they are currently 
below their target levels. However, firms far away 
from an upgrade or downgrade will be in better 
position to increase their debt levels if they are be-
low their target, since they will be less concerned 
about a change in rating”. 
In contrast with the trade-off theory, here the bene-
fits related to tax shields and the costs of financial 
distress are of second order (Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999; Myers and Majluf, 1988). Further-
more, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) stress that, 
in the pecking order model, the optimal capital 
structure does not determine the level of debt; un-
like the trade-off theory, there is no optimal debt 
ratio. Firms will issue more or less debt depending 
on access to internal funds when financing an in-
vestment. Leverage will function as a short-term 
offset to finance a predicted deficit. Thus, when 
investments exceed internal capital, firms will in-
crease the amount of debt, and vice versa (Frank 
and Goyal, 2003). The pecking order theory states 
that there is a hierarchy for the sources of financing 
firm’s projects. Projects should be financed, first, by 
internal funds (retained earnings), when internal 
funds are exhausted the firm can use debt, and final-
ly when the firm reaches its debt capacity, it can, 
then, issue equity. The reason beyond this hierarchy 
is the asymmetric information between managers 
and outside investors (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Fama and French (2000) determine 
the logic beyond the pecking order theory as fol-
lows. Managers may issue risky securities when 
those securities are overpriced. But when new se-
curities issue are announced, investors having infe-
rior information about the value of the firm’s assets 
can misprice those securities. Consequently, the 
new securities will be underpriced in the market. 
Managers, in turn, will pass projects with a positive 
net present value which will be financed by issuing 
equity, because managers work to achieve the ma- 
ximum benefits for shareholders. In order to avoid 
this problem, managers prefer to finance projects, 
first, by retained earnings where there is no asym-
metric information, followed by debt issue and, 
finally, with equity. Kisgen (2006) argues that “con-
trary to the implications of the pecking order theory, 
in some cases, firms that are near an upgrade may 
choose to issue equity instead of debt in order to 
obtain the benefits of higher rating, and firms that 
are near a downgrade may avoid issuing debt to 
prevent the extra costs that result from a down-
grade”. So firms will not be restricted to finance 
their projects according to the sequence of the pec- 
king order theory. Kisgen (2006) tests the effect of 
the credit rating changes on the pecking order 
theory and finds that credit rating has a significant 
effect on the capital structure decision. Both theo-
ries, trade-off and pecking order, try to explain the 
capital structure choice through a set of factors. 
Which factors are really relevant in a firm’s funding 
choice is one key aspect for the topic. There are 
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many papers that tackle this issue: what are the 
determinants of capital structure choice? The identi-
fication of these determinants may not be the most 
challenging part of the process, as many of them 
have an intuitive understanding. Many factors are 
difficult to define in an econometric model, so prox-
ies must be used. If these proxy indicators are not 
constructed carefully, then, the results might turn 
out skewed. These determinants are 1) the tax bene-
fits, 2) bankruptcy and financial distress costs and 
3) information asymmetry. Different empirical stu-
dies address the relevance of the referred determi-
nants, using a variety of measure indicators such as 
size, profitability, growth, industry classification, 
etc. These studies do not lead to the same unique 
conclusion as regards which capital structure theory 
is the most adaptable to the real world. That is, there 
is not yet a theory that explains fully the capital 
structure decisions of all firms. 
The study examines the impact of credit rating on 
the capital structure decisions of 169 MENA banks 
by running two models: the first model includes the 
determinants of capital structure most commonly 
used in the literature and the second model includes 
all the variables used in the first model plus credit 
rating as a dummy variable. The study also 
 
investigates the determinants of credit rating. Final-
ly, the study examines the impact of both credit 
rating and capital structure decision on the banks’ 
performance. Therefore, this study is an attempt to 
answer the following questions: 1) what are the 
main determinants of capital structure? 2) how does 
credit rating affect capital structure? 3), what are the 
main determinants of credit rating? and 4) what is 
the effect of capital structure and credit rating on 
bank performance? The sample includes those 
banks that locate in ten MENA countries, namely: 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen over the 2014 period and data are collected 
from the BankScope database. All banks that do not 
have information in the 2014 were excluded. Also, 
all banks with any missing observations for any 
variable during the sample period were dropped. 
After excluding all the missing observations, the 
sample size will be 169 banks. The sampled banks 
are divided into two basic groups: the first one in-
cludes banks with credit rating (79 banks), the 
second one includes banks without any credit rating 
(90 banks). From Table 1, it appears that banks with 
credit rating represent 47% of the total No. of 
banks.  
Table 1. The sample  
Country Banks with credit rating Banks without credit rating Total banks 
UAE 22 7 29 
Egypt 11 22 33 
Bahrain 10 8 18 
Jordan 9 6 15 
Saudi Arabia 8 3 11 
Qatar 7 4 11 
Lebanon 4 22 26 
Kuwait 4 10 14 
Oman 2 3 5 
Yemen 2 5 7 
Total 79 90 169 
Source: BankScope. 
 
The results indicate that credit rating has an influen-
tial effect on the capital structure decision; banks with 
credit rating use more debt than banks without any 
credit rating. The results also reveal that CRs do not 
rely heavily on quantitative factors in their rating, only 
the size and the country rating have the most pro-
nounced effect on credit rating. Finally, the results 
imply that banks’ profitability correlates positively 
with credit rating while correlates negatively with the 
debt ratio. To my knowledge, no previous studies 
investigating the relationship between credit rating and 
capital structure have focused empirically solely on 
the MENA banks, rendering this present study unique.  
This study is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews 
the relevant literature of the determinants of capital 
structure. Section 2 presents for the study hypotheses 
and models. Section 3 reports the main the results of 
the three themes of this study which are the determi-
nants of capital structure, the determinants of credit 
rating and the relationship between capital structure, 
credit rating and bank performance measured by prof-
itability. Final Section concludes the study. 
1. Literature review  
1.1. The determinants of capital structure.  
1.1.1. Profitability. The relationship between profita-
bility and capital structure can be viewed from two 
points of view. First: trade-off theory framework sug-
gests that profitable firms should borrow more to 
take tax advantage. Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
argue that companies may use more debt relative to 
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equity to make the best use of the tax deductibility of 
interest payments, so profitable firms use more debt to 
obtain tax shields. This positive relationship is sup-
ported by the Bowen et al. (1982), Dammon and Sen-
bet (1988) and Givoly et al. (1992). Second: pecking 
order theory views that the firm’s need to borrow ei-
ther long-term or short-term is decreased as the profit-
ability of the firm increases, so there is a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that, 
according to the pecking order theory, retained earn-
ings are considered the first preference for financing 
firms’ investment followed by debt financing and last 
comes new equity issue, where the cost of issuing new 
equity is high because of the transaction costs. Conse-
quently, profitability allows firms to use retained earn-
ings rather than external finance. This theoretical neg-
ative relation between profitability and leverage is 
supported by the empirical results of Toy et al. (1974), 
Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), Bennett 
and Donnely (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Booth et al. (2001), Bevan and Danbolt (2002), Mi-
chaelas et al. (1999), Fama and French (2002), Bevan 
and Danbolt (2004), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Lopez-
Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008), Daskalakis and Psil-
laki (2008), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), Degryse et 
al. (2012), Palacin-Sanchez et al. (2013) and Mateev 
et al. (2013).  
1.1.2. Asset structure (tangibility). Asset structure is 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets and it is used as 
a proxy for collateral. When a firm requires a loan 
from a lender, the lender wants to reduce the risk that 
he carries, so he may require collateral to save himself. 
By increasing collateral, the firm’s ability to use debt 
will increase, the lower the financing costs of the firm, 
the lower the costs of financial distress in case of 
bankruptcy, and also reducing the agency problems. 
The financial distress and agency theory suggests that 
there is a positive relation between leverage and colla-
teral. The empirical results of Bradley et al. (1984), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales, 
(1995), Kremp et al. (1999), and Frank and Goyal 
(2003) support the positive relation between asset 
structure and leverage. Booth et al. (2001) and Nivo-
rozhkin (2002), when examining the capital structure 
in the developing countries, found a negative relation 
between asset structure and leverage. Chittenden et al. 
(1996) found a positive relation between asset struc-
ture and long-term forms of debt and negative relation 
with short-term debt. De Jong (1999), Michaelas et al. 
(1999), Bevan and Danbolt (2004), Sogorb-Mira 
(2005), Degryse et al. (2012) and Mateev et al. (2013) 
all confirm the positive relationship between tangible 
assets and leverage. Degryse et al. (2012) and Mateev 
et al. (2013) assert that asset structure may affect 
short-term and long-term debt differently.   
1.1.3. Non-debt tax shield. Most of the empirical stu-
dies examine the relationship between capital structure 
and non-debt tax shield. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) extended Miller’s (1977) study of non-debt tax 
shields and found that, apart from interest expenses, 
depreciation and investment tax credits (non-debt tax 
shields) could also provide tax benefits to firms. They 
also argued that a firm with larger non-debt tax shields 
is expected to use a smaller amount of debt. In his 
empirical work, Wald (1999) employed the ratio of 
depreciation expense to total assets and found a nega-
tive correlation between leverage and non-debt tax 
shields. Empirical tests of the non-debt tax shield ef-
fect on debt policy are mixed. For example, Givoly et 
al. (1992), Graham (1996) and Lopez-Gracia and So-
gorb-Mira (2008) found a negative relationship be-
tween the firm’s debt and NDTS supporting DeAnge-
lo and Masulis’ (1980) substitutability hypothesis, that 
is, non-debt tax deductions substitute for the tax shield 
benefits of debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) findings 
show that there is a negative relationship between the 
non-debt tax shield and the leverage. Bradley et al. 
(1984), Bathala et al. (1994), Jiraporn and Gleason 
(2007) and Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) found 
a positive relationship between leverage and non-debt 
tax shield. Finally, Degryse et al. (2012) found a nega-
tive (positive) relationship between long-term debt 
(short-term debt) and non-debt tax shield using a sam-
ple of Dutch SMEs. On the other hand Ozkan (2001) 
argues that this proxy might not represent the non-debt 
tax shield and that firms with higher deprecation ratios 
would have lower growth opportunities and, therefore, 
he suggested a positive relationship.  
1.1.4. Liquidity. According to Ozkan (2001), liquidi-
ty ratio may have unclear impact on leverage. Positive 
relation may exist between liquidity and leverage be-
cause more liquidity increases the firm’s ability to 
meet its short-term financial obligations when they 
become due. Negative relation may also exist; the 
more liquid is the firm, the more incentives to use 
these assets to finance its investments instead of using 
debt to finance the investment. Eldomiaty (2007) sug-
gests that there is a negative relationship between 
leverage and liquidity proxy. Sbeti (2010), Nikolaos et 
al. (2007) and Ozkan (2001) find a negative relation-
ship between liquidity and leverage. Furthermore, 
since the sample we examine in this study is banks 
liquidity, it is crucial. Liquidity is measured by using 
the banking liquidity ratio of net loans to total assets.  
1.1.5. Size. Rajan and Zingales (1995) point out that 
the effect of size on leverage is unclear. The trade-off 
theory argues a positive relation between the firm size 
and leverage because large firms are more diversified 
and this diversification reduces the operating risk. 
Since the probability of bankruptcy for large firms is 
small and the bankruptcy cost is low, this encourages 
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large firms to use more debt. Large firms have lower 
agency costs than smaller firms (Chung, 1993). They 
may be able to make the best use of economies of 
scale in issuing long- term debt and can exert bargain-
ing power over creditors (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 
2006). Large firms may be able to take advantage of 
the tax shield, so they require more debt (Deesomsak, 
Paudyal and Pescetto, 2004). They are easier to access 
the credit market and borrow at more favorable inter-
est rates (Ferri and Jones, 1979). Large firms do not 
suffer from information asymmetries with lenders 
(Cassar and Holmes, 2003). The vast majority of stu-
dies find a positive relationship between firm size and 
leverage both for large firms and SMEs (see Van Dijk, 
1997; De Jong, 1999; Fama and French, 2002; Mi-
chaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2004; So-
gorb-Mira, 2005; Hall et al., 2004; Lopez-Gracia and 
Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; 
Degryse et al., 2012; Palacin-Sanchez et al., 2013: 
Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015). Akhtar and Oliv-
er (2009) find a similar relationship for both multina-
tional and domestic Japanese firms. Furthermore, 
studies in the emerging market found a similar results 
to the previous ones such as Huang and Song (2006), 
Booth et al. (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) all 
support a positive relationship. On the other hand, the 
pecking order theory postulates a negative relation 
between the firm’s size and leverage. Small firms 
prefer to use short-term debt as they pay more than 
large firms to obtain equity or long-term debt. Small 
firms tend to use a large amount of short-term debt 
because of the lower costs associated with this type of 
financing (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Another reason 
is related to the cost of information gathering and 
monitoring, where it will be difficult for the lender to 
generate the required information about large firms 
that spread their transactions in many areas, but it is 
easy to collect comprehensive information on small 
firms, as a result, small firms tend to use more bank 
debt (Ojeh and Manrique, 2005). This inverse relation 
is consistent with the empirical studies of Kester 
(1986), Kremp et al. (1999), and Titman and Wessel 
(1988) while Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Dasilas 
and Papasyriopoulos (2015) found that the relation 
between size and debt will depend on the proxy used 
to measure the leverage (short-term debt, long-term 
debt and total debt). Size of the bank will be measured 
as the natural logarithm of total assets, same measure 
used by Homaifar et al. (1994).  
1.1.6. Inflation. During inflationary periods the real 
cost of debt decreases. This positive relation is sug-
gested by Jaffe (1978), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), 
and Modigliani (1982). Inflation rate is measured by 
using the consumer price index for each country dur-
ing the sample period of 2004.  
1.1.7. Operating risk. Frank and Goyal (2009) argue 
that companies with volatile stock are expected to be 
riskier due to the fact that prices reflect the business 
risk of the bank. Both the pecking order theory and the 
trade-off theory predict a negative relationship be-
tween the risk and leverage. Higher risk means that the 
probability of paying their debt is less and, hence, 
lenders will ask for higher return. Some studies such 
as Bradley et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Walsh and Ryan (1997), Kremp et al. (1999), and 
Booth et al. (2001) suggest that operating risk is in-
versely related to the use of debt, since the financial 
distress increase as a result of the unstable earnings. 
Also firms’ accumulation of cash during periods of 
stable earnings increases, in order to be able to operate 
in periods of low earnings, and meet the unexpected 
conditions (Gaud et al., 2005). Operating risk will be 
measured by using the standard deviation of total op-
erating income for the bank of the last three years 
divided by the mean of operating income for those 
three years.  
1.1.8. Growth opportunities. The relationship between 
growth opportunities and the leverage is ambiguous. 
Negative relationship is expected according to agency 
theory, where growth opportunities reduce the liquida-
tion value (collateral asset), since those growth oppor-
tunities are intangible. Consequently, the firm ability 
to use debt is limited. However, the pecking order 
theory postulates that there is a positive relation, 
where in the growth stage, firms require more money 
to fund their investment, as a result, highly growing 
firms may tend to use more debt to finance their in-
vestment. The contradiction is not only between dif-
ferent theories, but also among different empirical 
studies (Myers, 1977; Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Barclay and Smith, 1996; 
and Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) found a negative rela-
tion between growth opportunities and debt. The stu-
dies of Graham and Harvey (2001), Fama and French 
(2002), Jiraporn and Gleason (2007) and Lopez-
Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) also verify the nega-
tive relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage. On the other hand, a positive relation is con-
sistent with empirical studies of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Michaelas et al. (1999). Moreover, firms 
that grow are more likely to experience a strain on 
their internal funds and more likely to resort to exter-
nal finance, preferably, debt (Mateev et al. 2013). 
Michaelas et al. (1999), Sogorb-Mira (2005), De-
gryse et al. (2012), Palacin-Sanchez et al. (2013) 
and Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) confirm 
that growth opportunities have a positive impact on 
leverage of Greek listed firms. In addition, Chen 
(2004) also finds a positive relationship in a sample 
of Chinese companies. Furthermore, Al-Sakran 
(2001) finds that the effect of growth on leverage is 
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negative for certain sectors and insignificant for 
others. This could be interpreted as that companies 
in different industries have different relationship 
between leverage and growth. However, Chitten-
den et al. (1996), Jordan et al. (1998), and Ozkan 
(2000) found mixed evidence, where the relation 
will depend on the measurement of debt either by 
total debt or short-term debt or long-term debt. This 
is supported by the results of Bevan and Danbolt 
(2002) which indicate that growth opportunities are 
positively related to short-term debt and negatively 
to long-term debt. Growth opportunities are meas-
ured as the percentage change in total assets (Tit-
man and Wessels, 1988).  
1.2. The determinants of credit rating.  
1.2.1. Leverage. Firms finance their operations with 
liabilities and equity. In general, as you increase the 
level of debt in the capital structure of an entity, other 
variables hold constant, the company becomes riskier. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between 
credit rating and debt level. According to Bouzouita 
and Young (1998), a high level of leverage increases 
the probability of default and the adverse variations in 
underwriting and/or economic conditions may, there-
fore, affect the rating. Shiu and Chiang (2008) add that 
a firm with high debt tends to have a high financial 
uncertainty and, consequently, high risk of insolvency. 
Cantor and Packer (1997), Blum, Lim and Mackinlay 
(1998), Adams et al. (2003), Gray et al. (2006) and 
Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) argue that high 
level of leverage may be associated with greater un-
certainty, consequently, increasing the probability of 
bankruptcy, which results in decreasing the likelihood 
that firms will be rated. On the other hand, Kemper 
(2011) finding shows that credit rating is not a first 
order concern of capital structure decisions, and that 
the model does not hold through the different classes 
of credit rating. However, Shen et al. (2012) find that 
the effects between credit rating on capital structure 
persist significantly in the context of trade-off and 
pecking order theory.   
1.2.2. Profitability. Generally, a profitable firm has a 
greater ability to generate cash to meet its financial 
obligations (Gray et al., 2006). In this context, we 
expect a positive relationship between credit rating 
and profitability. According to Bouzouita and Young 
(1998), “profitability reflects the ability of manage-
ment to maintain strong operation and adequate pric-
ing”. In this sense, companies that experience a sus-
tained increase in the level of their surplus are more 
likely to receive a better rating. Adams et al. (2003) 
point out that examination of profitability enables 
financial analysts and industry regulators to assess a 
firm’s ability to invest annual surpluses efficiently in 
order to generate new business. Furthermore, meas-
ures of profitability also provide insights into man-
agement’s ability to control expenses effectively and 
to set competitive rates of premium. Measuring profit-
ability provides an indication of the extent to which 
firms can invest money in an efficient way. The great-
er the profitability, the lower the insolvency risk and, 
consequently, the better the firms’ credit rating (Brot-
man, 1989, Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Adams et al., 
2003; and Gray et al., 2006).  
1.2.3. Liquidity. According to Carson and Scoot 
(1997) and Bouzouita & Young, (1998), a high degree 
of liquidity enables the insurer to meet unexpected 
needs for cash without having to sell assets at a dis-
counted value”. In general, higher liquidity indicates 
that a firm has a better ability to cover short-term lia-
bilities with current assets that can be transformed into 
money much faster than long-term assets (Roje, 
2005). Empirical evidence shows that liquidity is an 
important factor in the corporate decision to obtain a 
credit rating (Adams et al., 2003).  
1.2.4. Size. As observed in business practice, large 
companies have easier access to credit and are consi-
dered important for the economy of a country as a 
whole. Thus, they tend to receive aid from the gov-
ernment, as they are too big to fail. Moreover, Bou-
zouita and Young (1998, p. 27) argue that “large com-
panies are better able to sustain unfavorable changes 
in economic conditions”. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
agree when they mention that large companies have 
high rating because of their low market risks. Kim and 
Gu (2004) found a positive relationship between size 
and rating. According to these authors, this is due to 
their better ability to minimize the impact of econom-
ic, social, and political changes. According to Blum, 
Lim and Mackinlay (1998), larger firms tend to be 
more diversified and have easier access to capital 
markets, so their ability to face financial difficulties is 
high as a result they are more likely to receive a higher 
credit rating. This is consistent with Bouzouita and 
Young (1998), who suggest that larger firms depend 
on economies of scale in their operations and have 
managerial expertise that enables the firm to overcome 
financial difficulties.  
1.2.5. Growth. More growth opportunities mean more 
future cash flow, less future uncertainty and less insol-
vency risk. According to Pottier and Sommer (1999) 
and Adams et al. (2003), higher growth opportunities 
are associated with higher credit rating. In the same 
view, Bouzouita and Young (1998, p. 26) claim that 
“firms who experience a sustained increase in the 
level of their surplus are more likely to receive a 
better rating”.  
1.2.6. Interest coverage. According to Blum, Lim 
and Mackinlay (1998) and Gray et al. (2006), the 
higher the interest coverage ratio, the higher the credit 
rating. Higher interest coverage means that firms are 
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able to meet their financial obligations and this will be 
associated with lower risk. The interest coverage 
ratios attempt to capture a company’s ability to 
generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (Murcia 
et al. 2014). Therefore, we expected financial cover-
age to be positively correlated to a credit rating. Ac-
cording to Gray et al. (2006), credit rating tends to be 
highly sensitive to a firm’s interest coverage ratio; 
thus, firms with higher coverage ratios are likely to 
have higher credit rating. For Ashbaugh-Skaife, Col-
lins and LaFond (2006), as a company’s operating 
cash flow declines, the default risk increases, leading 
to lower credit rating. Thus, a low level of financial 
coverage may represent high risk.  
1.2.7. Country rating. Borensztein, Cowan, and 
Valenzuela (2006) point out that there is a posi-
tive relationship between sovereign rating and 
bank rating. Banks are highly leveraged than any 
other non-financial corporations, so they are more 
sensitive to the fluctuations in the macro condi-
tions related to sovereign defaults, also, banks are 
greatly affected by sovereign defaults, especially 
when part of the bank portfolios are public  
liabilities.  
1.3. Capital structure, credit rating and bank 
performance. Most empirical studies that ana-
lyze the relationship between capital structure and 
firm performance have been done for individual 
countries, thus, limiting the generalizability of the 
results of such studies. The purpose for this study 
is to fill the gap related to capital structure and 
bank performance in the MENA area. Some studies 
have concluded that the relationship between capital 
structure and firm performance is both positive and 
negative (Tian et al., 2007; Tsangyaa et al., 2009; 
Saeedi and Mahmoodi, 2011; Abor, 2005; Oke and 
Afolabi, 2008), others concluded that the relationship 
is negative (Narendar et al., 2007; Pratheepkanth, 
2011; Shah, et al., 2011; Onaolapo and Kajola, 2010). 
Yet, other studies have documented a positive rela-
tionship (Shoaib and Siddiqui, 2011; Aman, 2011; 
Chowdhury and Chowdhury, 2010; Omorogie and 
Erah, 2010; Akintoye, 2008). With these mixed and 
conflicting results, the quest for examining the rela-
tionship between capital structure and firm perfor-
mance has remained a puzzle and empirical study 
continues.  
2. Methodology 
2.1. Study hypotheses. This study tests the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: There is a positive association between capital 
structure and profitability. 
H2: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and tangibility. 
H3: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and non-debt tax shield. 
H4: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and liquidity. 
H5: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and bank size. 
H6: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and inflation. 
H7: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and operating risk. 
H8: There is a positive association between capi-
tal structure and growth opportunities. 
H9: There is a negative association between leve-
rage and credit rating. 
H10: There is a positive association between 
profitability and credit rating. 
H11: There is a positive association between li-
quidity and credit rating. 
H12: There is a positive association between bank 
size and credit rating. 
H13: There is a positive association between 
growth rates and credit rating. 
H14: There is a positive association between in-
terest coverage and credit rating. 
H15: There is a positive association between 
country rating and credit rating. 
H16: There is a significant relationship between 
capital structure, credit rating and bank per- 
formance. 
2.2. Models. 2.2.1. The determinants of capital 
structure decisions. The study aims to examine 
the main determinants of capital structure taking 
into account the effect of credit rating. To do this, 
two models are set. The first one includes the 
most commonly used variables in determining the 
leverage. The second includes the variables in-
cluded in model (1) in addition to credit rating to 
test the impact of credit rating on the bank leverage.  
Model (1): 
DEBT = Į + ȕ1PROF + ȕ2TANG + ȕ3LIQ + ȕ4NDTS + ȕ5INF + ȕ6RISK + ȕ7SIZE + ȕ8GRO + İ.                  (1) 
Model (2): 
DEBT = Į + ȕ1PROF + ȕ2TANG + ȕ3LIQ + ȕ4NDTS + ȕ5INF + ȕ6RISK + ȕ7SIZE + ȕ8GRO + ȕ9CR + İ.     (2) 
 
Where DEBT is a measure of capital structure and is 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
PROF is the profitability and measured by return on 
equity, TANG is the tangibility and is measured by 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, NDTS is non-
debt tax shield and is measured by dividing depreci-
ation on total assets, LIQ denotes to liquidity and is 
measured by the ratio of net loans to total assets, 
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INF is inflation rate, RISK is measured by the va-
riance coefficient of operating income, SIZE is  the 
natural logarithm of total assets, GRO is growth and 
is measured by percentage change in total assets, 
CR is credit rating and is a dummy variable (equal 
to 1) for banks with credit rating and (equal to 0) for 
banks without any credit rating. The dependent 
variable used in this paper is the debt ratio (D/TA). 
According to the agency, cost theory of capital 
structure, high leverage are expected to reduce 
agency cost, reduce inefficiency and, eventually, 
lead to improvements in firm’s performance. Berger 
(2002) argues that an increase in the leverage ratio 
should result in lower agency costs outside equity 
and improve firm’s performance, all other things 
being equal. From the analysis above, an inverse 
relationship is expected to be between leverage and 
firm performance.  
2.2.2. The Determinants of credit rating. The study 
also investigates the determinants of credit rating 
using a logistic regression model, where the depen-
dent variable takes 1 for all banks with credit rating 
and 0, otherwise. A binary logistic regression is 
modelled as follows: 
CR= Į + ȕ1LEV + ȕ2PROF+ ȕ3LIQ + ȕ4SIZE +  
+ ȕ5GRO + ȕ6COV + ȕ7CORA + İ,                        (3) 
where CR is credit rating and is a dummy variable 
(equal to 1) for banks with credit rating and (equal 
to 0) for banks without any credit rating, COV is the 
interest coverage and is measured by the ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax to interest expense, 
and CORA is the country rating and is measured by 
the foreign currency long-term rating and is a cate-
gorical variable that is equal to 1 for banks with A, 
2 for BBB, 3 for BB and 4 for B rating. 
2.2.3. The impact of credit rating and capital struc-
ture decision on banks’ profitability. The effect of 
capital structure decision and credit rating on the 
performance of the bank is examined in this study. 
 
The return on asset (ROA) as a measure of profita-
bility is regressed against the ratio of total debt to 
total assets as a measure of leverage. The credit 
rating is added as a dummy variable (takes 1) for 
banks with credit rating and (takes zero) for banks 
without any credit rating. The bank size is used as a 
control variable. The following model is used: 
PROF = Į + ȕ1LEV + ȕ2CR + ȕ3SIZE + İ.             (4) 
2.2.4. Measurement of capital structure. In this 
study, capital structure is measured by the ratio of 
total debt divided by total assets. Chittenden et al. 
(1996) argue that the use of total debt will make it 
difficult to identify exactly the effect of total debt 
on leverage, where long-term debt and short-term 
debt will have different impacts on some indepen-
dent variables such as the size, collateral asset and 
growth opportunities. As a result of data limitation, 
the study will measure debt by using book values 
rather than market values. It is supposed to be better 
to use the market values than the book values. But 
most of the empirical studies use the book value, 
where it is found that there is a highly correlation 
between the book value of debt and the market val-
ue of debt, and the difference will be very small. 
Therefore, the book value of debt can be used in-
stead of the market value.  
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the study variables. On av-
erage, banks have a debt ratio of about 52.2%. The 
debt ratio variation across the sample was large, 
ranging from a maximum 68.13% and a minimum 
of 6.88%. With regards to the explanatory variables, 
the average size is 14.03% with median of 11.95% 
and standard deviation of 1.49. The correlation re-
sults (not enclosed) show that the multicollinearity 
problem does not exist as the highest correlation 
coefficient is -0.298 between size and tangibility. 
Table 2. The descriptive statistics 
Variable Max Min Mean Median St. deviation 
Leverage 68.13 6.88 52.19 58.65 14.71 
Profitability 18.35 0 2.55 1.89 3.65 
Tangibility 0.118 0 .0144 0.02 0.01 
Non-debt tax shield 0.936 0 0.075 0 0 
Liquidity 74.83 0 31.41 30.2 12.36 
Inflation 13.55 0.45 3.88 3.49 2.57 
Risk 1.86 0.08 0.188 0.15 0.12 
Size 19.29 10.02 14.03 11.95 1.49 
Growth opportunities 93.36 -40.39 23.45 12.86 11.42 
Note: Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, Profitability is measured by return on equity, Tangibility is measured by 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, NDTS is non-debt tax shield and is measured by dividing depreciation on total assets, Liquidity is 
measured by the ratio of net loans to total assets, Inflation: inflation rate, Risk is measured by the variance coefficient of operating 
income, Size is  the natural logarithm of total assets, Growth opportunities are measured by percentage change in total assets.  
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3.2. Regression results. The results from Table 3 
indicate a significant positive relationship at 1% 
between credit rating and leverage. The effect of 
adding credit rating into the model is clear, as the 
adjusted R square increased from 0.575 to 0.628 
indicating that adding credit rating to the model 
adds more explanatory power. Table 3 shows that 
profitability has a significant negative relation be-
tween the profitability and the gearing. This result is 
consistent with the pecking order theory and, also, 
matches with the empirical results of Titman and 
Wessels (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth 
et al. (2001) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002), but it 
contradicts with the tradeoff theory and the empiri-
cal results of Bowen et al. (1982), Givoly et al. 
(1992) where profitable firms should use more debt 
to benefit from the tax shield. Table 3 also shows 
that the relationship between tangibility and leve-
rage is negative and statistically significant. This 
matches with the results of Booth et al. (2001) and 
Nivorozhkin (2002) who investigate the determi-
nants of capital structure on developing countries 
and find that tangibility is inversely related to debt. 
The result differs from the predicted sign of the 
pecking order theory and tradeoff theory and the 
empirical evidence that supports the positive rela-
tion between tangibility and gearing such as Titman 
and Wesels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Kremp et al. (1999), and Frank and Goyal (2003).  
From Table 3, it is found that tangibility has the 
biggest coefficient indicating the importance of 
tangibility in the capital structure decision and the 
degree to which capital structure is influenced by 
tangibility. The result of non-debt tax shield 
(NDTS) matches with the tradeoff theory indicating 
that there is a significant positive relation between 
the NDTS and leverage. This result, also, is in ac-
cordance with the empirical results of Haugen and 
Senbet (1986) and Mackie-Mason (1990). Liquidity 
is expected to have a negative relationship with 
leverage. But the result in Table 3 indicates that 
liquidity has an insignificant positive correlation 
with the debt ratio. According to the pecking order 
theory, more liquidity results in lower leverage. 
Inflation rate: inflation rate measured by consumer 
price index (CPI) has a significant positive relation 
with debt ratio as a result of reducing the cost of 
debt during the inflationary periods. This is consis-
tent with the results of Homaifar et al. (1994). For 
operating risk, banks with relatively high operating 
risk will have incentives to lower their leverage. 
This significant negative relation matches with the 
tradeoff theory, since increasing earnings volatility 
increases the likelihood of financial distress, then, 
the use of debt will be limited. The result is the 
same with the result obtained by Titman and Wes-
sels (1988), Kremp et al. (1999), Booth et al. (2001) 
and Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015). 
Table 3. The determinants of capital structure 
Variables Coefficient (without credit rating) 
Coefficient (with 
credit rating) 
Constant 6.99*** 7.22*** 
Profitability -2.79*** -3.26*** 
Tangibility -0.29*** -0.349* 
Non-debt tax shield 3.84** 4.35*** 
Liquidity 0.047 0.015 
Inflation  0.31 0.96** 
Risk -6.93*** -10.95** 
Size -1.22* -8.89*** 
Growth 0.13** 0.085** 
Credit rating  9.15*** 
F- value 24.87 *** 38.55*** 
Adjusted R square 0.575 0.628 
Note: Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, Profitability is measured by return on equity, Tangibility 
is measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, NDTS is 
non-debt tax shield and is measured by dividing depreciation on 
total assets, Liquidity is measured by the ratio of net loans to total 
assets, Inflation: inflation rate, Risk is measured by the variance 
coefficient of operating income, Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, Growth opportunities are measured by percentage 
change in total assets, and Credit rating is a dummy variable (equal 
to 1) for banks with CR and (equal to 0) for banks without any CR. 
*** 1%; **5%; *10%. 
There is a conflicting evidence regarding the relation 
between leverage and the size. The result in Table 3 
presents a significant negative relation between the 
size of the bank and leverage. The pecking order 
theory indicates a negative relation, and the empirical 
results of Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), and Kremp et al. (1999) also find the same 
negative relation. But this contradicts with the posi-
tive relation between the size and the debt ratio 
suggested by the tradeoff theory and supported by 
the evidence of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et 
al. (2001), and Bevan and Danbolt (2002). Growth 
opportunities: the result in Table 3 is consistent with 
the assumptions of the pecking order theory, where 
there is a significant positive relation between growth 
opportunities and the debt ratio. More growing firms 
will use internally generated funds as a result of 
growth; those highly growing firms will seek for an 
external source of finance to be able to finance their 
growth. The results match with the results of Michae-
las et al. (1999), and Bevan and Donbolt (2002), but 
contradict the tradeoff theory and also the empirical 
evidence of Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). In addition, there is a positive relation 
between credit rating and leverage and this relation is 
highly significant at 1%. The coefficient of credit 
rating is large (9.15) meaning that banks with credit 
rating will issue debt by 9.15% more than banks with-
out credit rating can issue. The result is considered a 
confirmation of the results of Graham and Harvey 
(2001) who point out that credit rating is the second 
most important factor after maintenance of financial 
flexibility in the decision to issue more debt, and Kis-
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gen (2006) who argues that credit rating is very impor-
tant in the leverage decision.  
Table 4 shows that there are only two variables that 
are significant in determining credit rating, those 
variables are the size of the bank and foreign cur-
rency long-term rating as a measure for country 
rating. Size: there is a significant positive relation-
ship between the bank size and the probability of 
the bank to be rated as the bank size increases the 
likelihood that banks will be rated increases and this 
is consistent with previous studies of Blum et al. 
(1998). Country rating: there is a significant posi-
tive relation between the country rate and the like-
lihood that banks will be rated. Any increase in the 
country rate from one grade to a higher grade will 
increase the probability of banks located in this 
country to be rated and this matches with the results 
of Borensztein et al. (2006).  
Table 4. The determinants of credit rating 
Variables Coef Exp (B) 
Leverage  .085 1.088 
Profitability .173 1.129 
Liquidity  -.028 .992 
Size  1.398*** 3.779 
Growth opportunities  -.009 .989 
Interest coverage  -.161 .877 
Country rating (1) -7.190*** .000 
Country rating (2) 4.723*** 80.465 
Country rating (3) 5.466*** 92.911 
Country rating (4) 2.321*** 18.933 
Note: Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, Profitability is measured by return on equity, Liquidity 
is measured by the ratio of net loans to total assets, Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets, Growth opportunities are 
measured by percentage change in total assets, Interest cover-
age is measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
to interest expense, and Country rating is measured by foreign 
currency long-term rating will be used as a proxy for country 
rating and is a categorical variable which takes a value of 1 for 
banks with foreign currency long term rating A, 2 for BBB, 3 
for BB and 4 for B rating. ***1%. 
The results in Table 5 indicate that there is a nega-
tive relation between the debt ratio and the banks’ 
profitability and this relationship is significant at 
1% level. In addition, there is a positive relationship 
between credit rating and the profitability of banks 
and the result is statistically significant at 1% level. 
The size is positively and significantly associated 
with bank profitability.  
Table 5. The relationship between capital structure, 




Credit rating 0.627*** 
Size 0.862*** 
F. test 35.34*** 
R2 0.597 
Note: Leverage as a proxy for capital structure is measured by 
total debts to total assets. Credit rating is a dummy variable 
(equal to 1) for banks with credit rating and (equal to 0) for 
banks without any credit rating. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, Growth opportunities are measured by percentage 
change in total assets, *** 1%. 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of the study is to: 1) examine the 
impact of credit rating on capital structure decisions 
of MENA banks, 2) identify the determinants of 
credit rating, and 3) examine the effect of credit 
rating and capital structure on banks’ profitability. 
The effect of credit rating is an important determi-
nant besides the traditional determinants that are 
most commonly used by the academic literature. 
This has been achieved by regressing capital struc-
ture (measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets) against: profitability, tangibility (the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets), size of the bank (natural 
logarithm of total assets), non-debt tax shield, li-
quidity of the bank (the ratio of net loans to total 
assets), inflation rate, operating risk (variance coef-
ficient of operating income), growth opportunities 
(percentage change in total assets), and, finally, 
credit rating (a dummy variable equals to 1 for 
banks with credit rating and zero, otherwise). Capi-
tal structure is found to be significantly positively 
correlated with non-debt tax shield, inflation rate, 
growth opportunities, and credit rating, and signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with profitability, tangibil-
ity, operating risk, and size. The findings of this study 
support the hypothesis of credit rating as a determinant 
in firms’ choice of capital structure. Finally, the study 
found that banks’ profitability significantly and nega-
tively correlated with the debt ratio, and positively 
correlated with credit rating, but this correlation is not 
significant.  
This study has an implication on investors in their 
decisions to invest in the banking industry. It is also 
helpful for policy makers to understand how bank’s 
capital structure behaves so they could take into con-
sideration when issuing new regulations such as Basel 
III. On the other hand, this study has some limitations.  
One of these limitations is data availability as credit 
rating is available only for one year, so future research 
can generate better results if they use the rating data of 
different years. A risk with the present study is also  at 
there the sample may not be totally homogenous; dif-
ferences in jurisdiction between the countries may 
affect firms’ capital structure decisions differently. 
Future research can study whether the influence of 
credit rating in the capital structure choice of firms 
varies for different industries. Another possibility is to 
increase the number of firms in the sample, including 
firms from developing and developed countries. 
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Another extension of the present study would be to 
employ the same empirical set-up on MENA banks 
but using the corporate credit rating of another 
CRA (e.g., Moody’s) and see whether there are 
any differences between the impacts of rating con-
siderations between the different CRAs. Finally, the 
effect of 2008 financial crisis on capital structure and 
credit rating should be tested too. 
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